Toward a Dynamic Probabilistic Model for Vestibular Cognition by Andrew W. Ellis & Fred W. Mast
fpsyg-08-00138 January 30, 2017 Time: 15:15 # 1
PERSPECTIVE







University College London, UK
Faisal Karmali,
Harvard Medical School and






This article was submitted to
Cognition,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 07 October 2016
Accepted: 19 January 2017
Published: 01 February 2017
Citation:
Ellis AW and Mast FW (2017) Toward




Toward a Dynamic Probabilistic
Model for Vestibular Cognition
Andrew W. Ellis* and Fred W. Mast
Department of Psychology, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
We suggest that research in vestibular cognition will benefit from the theoretical
framework of probabilistic models. This will aid in developing an understanding of how
interactions between high-level cognition and low-level sensory processing might occur.
Many such interactions have been shown experimentally; however, to date, no attempt
has been made to systematically explore vestibular cognition by using computational
modeling. It is widely assumed that mental imagery and perception share at least in part
neural circuitry, and it has been proposed that mental simulation is closely connected
to the brain’s ability to make predictions. We claim that this connection has been
disregarded in the vestibular domain, and we suggest ways in which future research
may take this into consideration.
Keywords: mental imagery, mental simulation, spatial perspective taking, spatial cognition, self-motion
perception, particle filters, computational modeling
INTRODUCTION
In contrast to other sensory modalities, the vestibular sense has been widely neglected by cognitive
scientists. Vestibular information was until recently considered in the context of posture and
balance, and was therefore associated with reflexive behavior. However, Angelaki et al. (2009)
highlight the fact that the focus of research has shifted to include the involvement of the vestibular
system in spatial cognition. It is now known that several cortical areas are under vestibular
control (see Lopez et al., 2012 for a meta-analysis of vestibular neuroimaging studies) and recent
behavioral studies provide evidence of bi-directional interactions between higher-level cognition
and vestibular processing (see Mast et al., 2014 for a review).
Two recent experiments have provided interesting contributions to vestibular cognition.
Deroualle et al. (2015) showed that vestibular sensory input has an effect on spatial perspective
taking; if the participants were physically rotated in a direction congruent with the direction of
a mental self-rotation, they were faster in giving correct responses. This suggests that sensory
information about self-motion is involved in cognitive operations required when taking another
person’s perspective. Interestingly, Nigmatullina et al. (2015) demonstrated an effect in the reverse
direction; imagined self-motion affects the sensory processing of physical rotations. Specifically,
they showed that imagined self-motion influences both the onset of the vestibulo-ocular reflex
(VOR), and the perception of self-motion. These two studies compellingly demonstrate that
vestibular processing is nested and intertwined with cognitive processes. To date, however,
empirical findings in vestibular cognition remain a set of rather loosely connected phenomena
(Mast et al., 2014), and it is unclear how interactions between mental simulations and lower-level
processing of vestibular information can be embedded within a coherent theoretical framework.
This is rather surprising, since there is a long tradition of computational modeling in vestibular
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research. Indeed, due to its relatively well-understood pathways
at the subcortical level, the system is particularly amenable
to mathematical modeling, and a wealth of knowledge has
been ascertained in basic mechanisms of vestibular processing
(Merfeld et al., 1999; Zupan et al., 2002; Angelaki et al.,
2004; Angelaki and Yakusheva, 2009; Laurens et al., 2013) (see
MacNeilage et al., 2008; Selva and Oman, 2012 for overviews).
We claim that dynamic probabilistic models offer a
computational and theoretical framework for vestibular
cognition. There has been an increasing focus on Bayesian
inference in computational approaches to cognitive modeling
(Griffiths et al., 2008, 2012; Chater and Oaksford, 2013); higher
order cognitive processing is thought to require structured
representations, which can be implemented as Bayesian
Networks (Griffiths et al., 2010; Kwisthout et al., 2016). The
Bayesian approach has yielded successful attempts at explaining
a variety of phenomena, from categorization of objects (Kemp
et al., 2007) and counterfactual reasoning (Lucas and Kemp,
2012) to perceptual switching when viewing bi-stable stimuli
(Gershman et al., 2012). Similar computational models have
been proposed for lower-level processing in several sensory
modalities (Fetsch et al., 2012). In fact, probabilistic models
are well established in the vestibular domain, given the noisy
and ambiguous nature of the sensory afferent signals and the
fact that vestibular afferents are combined with proprioceptive
signals at a very early level in the brain (Angelaki et al., 2009).
Bayesian models can provide the optimal solution to the problem
of combining information from multiple sources. We have
previously argued that vestibular cognition can be viewed as
being similar to vestibular sensory processing, albeit in an oﬄine
mode of processing (Mast and Ellis, 2015). In this paper, we
claim that in order to investigate how higher-level cognition
and lower-level vestibular processing interact, it is useful to
consider cognitive influences as a hierarchical extension within a
Bayesian framework. Given that the vestibular system processes
sensory signals related to motion, further insight can be gained
by considering dynamical models.
DYNAMIC PROBABILISTIC MODELS
Bayesian inference gives a prominent role to prior information
or knowledge. On the one hand, prior knowledge may be built
into the system by evolution, or acquired during ontogeny. These
types of priors may reflect stable statistical properties of the
environment, and may be relatively inflexible. One particularly
well-known example is the prior belief that the head is usually
aligned with the gravitational vertical (Eggert, 1998), which has
been shown to partly explain the misperception of the visual
vertical (De Vrijer et al., 2009). On the other hand, priors may
reflect properties of a rapidly changing environment, and may
therefore be flexible. It is precisely this kind of flexible prior belief
that is interesting for the study of vestibular cognition.
In order to process dynamic vestibular sensory information,
the brain must possess a specific type of generative model; this can
be described as a state-space model (Karmali and Merfeld, 2012),
which allows the brain to infer the values of unobservable state
variables, such as the position and velocity of the head, based
on a sequence of noisy sensory input data from the semi-circular
canals (SCC). In addition, the brain is able to predict the sensory
consequences of active head movements (Cullen, 2012), and this
may be implemented as an active control input in the generative
model. A state space model can also be described as a dynamic
probabilistic model (Bishop, 2006). The lower part of Figure 1A
(Dynamic model) shows a graphical representation of such a
model. The variables are represented by nodes (circles), with the
arrows indicating stochastic relationships between variables. The
generative model consists of a process model f, which describes
the evolution of the latent state variables, and an observation
model g, which describes the dependence of the SCC afferent
signals (data) on the state variables. The process can implement
Newton’s laws of motion. The data nodes are shaded, indicating
that they are observed during sensory inference, whilst the state
variables are open, indicating that they must be inferred. At
each time step, the state variable depends on the state at the
previous time step, and a control input, which consists of a known
acceleration. This control input enables the brain to predict
its head velocity and position. Knowledge about the body’s
kinematics is useful in order to compute the expected sensory
consequences (re-afference) of active movements (Vonholst and
Mittelstaedt, 1950).
The exact nature of the dependence of the control input on
its parent nodes is encoded in the edges leading from the higher-
level nodes (Static model) in Figure 1A. These variables represent
parameters of a motion episode. In the case of a sinusoidal
rotation of the head at a given frequency, the brain may compute
the known acceleration based on the amplitude and direction
of motion. These variables, if they must also be inferred, can
be given prior distributions. The direction of motion can be
modeled as a binary random variable (either to the left or to the
right), and the prior on motion direction can be given a uniform
distribution, indicating that both directions are equally likely, or
could indicate a preference for either direction. The higher level
variables in the static model thus represent parameters that do
not change during the course of a motion event. Active head
movements are performed in order to achieve a goal at a more
abstract functional level, e.g., turning one’s head in order look at
something, or in order to achieve a communicative goal (Carriot
et al., 2014). The hierarchical model can be extended in order
to incorporate such higher-level intentions and goals (see the
unnamed uppermost nodes).
The exogenous control input is usually interpreted as being
derived from a motor action, in the form of an efference copy.
However, this input may represent any available knowledge about
statistical properties of the environment, or it can be derived from
covert actions (Pezzulo and Castelfranchi, 2009). In the context
of self-motion, this means that the brain is able to construct a
model of the kinematics, and of the expected vestibular sensory
afferents. The generative model opens the gates for higher-level
cognition, and in particular spatial perspective transformations
and imagined self-motion.
In order to gain an understanding of the involvement of
cognition in lower-level sensory processing, it is interesting
to consider how inference is performed in a dynamic
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FIGURE 1 | (A) A hierarchical dynamic probabilistic model for sensory inference. The lower part (Dynamic model) shows a representation of a basic dynamic
probabilistic model used for sensory inference. The circles represent random variables. Shaded circles are observed (sensory data); unshaded circles represent latent
variables. Bayesian inference is performed at each time step in order to estimate the state by combining the prior, given by the function f of the previous state and a
control input, with the data, which depends on the state through a function g. The upper part (Static model) of the figure shows a hierarchical extension to the
dynamic model. These variables do not change at the time scale of the state variables, and are used in order to construct a dynamic prior for inference. The variables
at the highest level are unnamed (. . .), indicating that the model can be extended. (B) The results of inferring the velocity and position. (C) The same generative
model being used to perform a simulation.
probabilistic model, and the role of predictions. A frequently
used inference algorithm is particle filtering (Doucet et al., 2000,
see Speekenbrink, 2016 for a recent introduction). Particle
filtering starts from an initial state, and then recursively applies
a sequence of computations. At each time step, a prediction is
first made for the velocity and position, based on the previous
state and known input. After predicting the state, the SCC data
are incorporated by computing how plausible the sensory signal
is, given the belief about the state. When combined, these two
steps implement sequential Bayesian inference; a prior belief is
computed by prediction, and then the likelihood is combined
with the prior to obtain a posterior estimate. By choosing a
specific kinematic model, one can specify a strong prior belief
that one is either at rest or in motion. The ability to flexibly
choose a kinematic model is essential in order to predict the
expected sensory consequences of active motion (Cullen et al.,
2011; Cullen, 2012). Sensory processes play a major role in
predicting the future, and sensory measurements serve to correct
the predictions. Figure 1B shows the results of inferring the
velocity and position, based on noisy sensory input from the
SCC during a 2 s leftward sinusoidal rotation of the head,
using a kinematic model which incorporates prior knowledge
about head acceleration. Using this knowledge, the model can
accurately estimate the true velocity (left), and the true position
(right).
FROM VESTIBULAR PROCESSING TO
HIGHER COGNITION
Given this rather constructive nature of vestibular sensory
processing, and the fact that this can explain velocity storage
(Karmali and Merfeld, 2012) and the illusion of translation
during off-vertical axis rotation (Laurens and Droulez, 2007),
we suggest that the act of imagining self-motion is related to
the generative activity of the vestibular network. A number of
recent articles have alluded to a link between mental imagery
and the brain’s predictive mechanisms (Grush, 2004; Moulton
and Kosslyn, 2009; Clark, 2012; Gambi and Pickering, 2015),
but few studies have addressed this issue within a computational
framework, with a view to providing a mechanistic explanation
of how mental imagery should be related to predictions.
A notable exception is Penny et al. (2013), who demonstrated
that various computations necessary for spatial cognition can be
performed within the same dynamical probabilistic model. To
our knowledge, there have been no previous attempts to link
imagined self-motion to vestibular processing in a computational
framework.
In order to link higher cognition to the model for sensory
inference, we can consider the extension to the basic dynamic
model presented in Figure 1A. What is required for higher-
level cognition is the ability to incorporate variables representing
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higher level priors into the basic dynamical model (Griffiths et al.,
2008). On the one hand, the model can infer the values of these
higher level direction and amplitude nodes (Andrieu et al., 2010).
On the other hand, the generative model may be used to perform
the different types of computations described in Penny et al.
(2013), in the form of Monte Carlo simulations, i.e., by running
the dynamic probabilistic model without incorporating sensory
data. This amounts to sampling from the prior distributions
(Berkes et al., 2011), albeit a dynamically constructed prior, given
by the process model. Static variables must be either fixed at
certain values, or sampled from their prior distributions, and,
crucially, incoming sensory data must be ignored. Figure 1C
shows the result of running a Monte Carlo simulation using the
same dynamic probabilistic model as in Figure 1B. However,
in this case, the sensory data, which indicate leftward motion,
are not incorporated, and the direction is to the right. This




The studies by Deroualle et al. (2015) and Nigmatullina
et al. (2015) suggest that simulated self-motion and self-
motion perception share common processes. We claim that
the computational framework described above can be used
to investigate these interactions in terms of probabilistic
computations. This need not entail that the brain uses the same
generative model for simulation and sensory inference; indeed,
in the experiment of Deroualle et al. (2015), participants were
required to perform a simulated rotation whilst simultaneously
processing sensory data, which implies that the brain must
either use spatially separated models, or implement a time-
sharing mechanism via oscillations (Lisman and Buzsáki,
2008) in order to separate the two processing streams. It is
worthwhile considering that mental simulations are performed
under the counterfactual assumptions that the contents of
one’s mental activity do not reflect the current state of
the world. For the purpose of modeling interactions, it is
sufficient to assume that the higher-level nodes used to
construct the kinematic model required for mental simulations
are shared, without committing to any specific lower-level
implementation. Figure 2 illustrates the idea that the low-
level dynamic graphical model can be used in sensory
inference mode or in simulation mode. We propose that
the brain may construct a ‘twinned’ counterfactual model
(Koller and Friedman, 2009) for the purpose of a mental
simulation; this model shares both higher-level components
with the factual model used for sensory inference, and
re-uses lower-level variables in order to perform realistic
simulations.
In Nigmatullina et al.’s (2015) experiment, participants were
required to imagine themselves rotating, prior to making
a judgment about their actual motion. This might have
resulted in the direction variable either being clamped or
having a strong prior, with the effect that, during subsequent
sensory inference, the participants may have inadvertently used
this strong prior. Participants were faster to detect motion
that was congruent with the direction they had previously
imagined, and slower to detect motion in the incongruent
direction, and the same result was obtained for the VOR
onset. Intriguingly, this pattern of response times is surprisingly
similar to that what one might expect to find if participants
were using prior knowledge to anticipate a given direction
(Leite and Ratcliff, 2011; Mulder et al., 2012). It is likely
that mental imagery exerts an influence on sensory inference
by ‘biasing’ higher-level variables, in a similar manner to
anticipation of sensory events. The direction of this influence
is shown in Figure 2 by the blue arrows. Imagining motion
led the participants to unintentionally create an expectation
for subsequent actual motion. This makes the claim that
mental imagery is related to prediction explicit, and explains
this connection in the context of a coherent computational
framework. A similar explanation may be proposed for
the experimental findings in Deroualle et al. (2015); here,
the direction of interaction is reversed, indicated by the
red arrows in Figure 2. Taken together, when required to
simultaneously perform simulation and sensory inference using
shared higher-level nodes in a probabilistic model, there is cross-
talk.
NEURONAL IMPLEMENTATION
Brooks and Cullen (2013) report that the cerebellum implements
a forward model, and at the level of the vestibular nuclei,
the expected afferent signals (re-afference) are suppressed.
Furthermore, thalamic vestibular neurons also distinguish
between active and passive head movements (Lopez and Blanke,
2011). It is not clear whether higher cognitive processes,
such as imagery or spatial perspective taking, involve such
low levels; however, there exist both direct and indirect
connections between the vestibular nuclei and parieto-insular
cortical (PIVC) areas known to process vestibular signals
(Kirsch et al., 2016). Furthermore, human subjects are able
to suppress the VOR by imagining a head-fixed target
(Jones et al., 1984). Thus, seemingly low-level reflexes require
considerable flexibility, depending on the organism’s goals and
intentions.
A broad overview of the cortical representation of vestibular
information is given in Lopez and Blanke (2011) and Lopez
et al. (2012). Vestibular neuroimaging studies involving cognitive
aspects are still scarce. In an fMRI study on imagined
self-rotation, zu Eulenburg et al. (2012) found activation
in regions involved in spatial processing, but failed to
find activation of PIVC. It is important to note, however,
that conditions using GVS and caloric vestibular stimulation
(CVS), which are usually used in lieu of actual physical
rotation, entail several problems (Klingner et al., 2016).
The authors point out that, due to the inappropriateness
of GVS and CVS, most imaging results of the vestibular
system may actually represent strong multisensory prediction
errors.
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FIGURE 2 | A computational framework that explains how interaction between mental simulation and perception occurs. For the purpose of mental
simulation, a twinned counterfactual model is constructed, which shares both higher-level and lower-level nodes with the factual model used for sensory inference.
The dynamic model may be run in either inference mode, or in simulation mode. During inference mode, sensory data are incorporated; in simulation mode, sensory
data must be ignored. The factual and counterfactual models reflect the fact that for simulation, the variables do not represent the state of the world. Interactions
between sensory and simulation models occur via the shared higher-level nodes.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH
The close connection between mental simulation and sensory
inference, through the use of common components of a
generative model, has strong implications for future experiments
in vestibular cognition. Special care must be taken to compare
experimental conditions in which participants perform cognitive
tasks, such as mental imagery or spatial perspective taking, with
control conditions in which participants use prior information
in order to form strong expectations about sensory inputs.
Furthermore, neuroimaging studies are required that specifically
investigate expectations of head and whole body movements,
the distinction between active and passive movement, egocentric
spatial transformations and the accumulation of vestibular
sensory evidence for decision-making. This will allow researchers
to disentangle the higher-level cognitive operations from
predictive processing during on-line sensory inference.
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CONCLUSION
We propose that dynamical probabilistic models will help
to advance the field of vestibular cognition. These types
of models have been successfully used in computational
approaches to lower-level vestibular processing, and represent
the state of the art in robotics and machine learning.
Recently, they have been applied to higher-level cognition.
We claim that the vestibular system is ideally suited for
investigating interactions between higher-level cognition and
lower-level sensory processing, and that these interactions
can be understood in terms of probabilistic computations
performed by the brain in order to run realistic counterfactual
simulations of self-motion. Probabilistic computational
modeling in combination with thorough experimentation
will bring vestibular science to the next stage and bridge
the gap to cognitive operations and foster new clinical
approaches.
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